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TEMPORAL, COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF
TRANSACTION COSTS; TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF HYBRID
VERTICAL INTER-FIItM RELATIONS
Niels G. Noorderhaven, Bart Nooteboom and Johannes Berger'
ABSTRACT
Hybrid vertical inter-firm relations are protracted buyer-seller relationships between
firms, intermediate forms if compared with market relations or hierarchical relations. In
this article, these relations are analyzed from the perspective of transaction cost
economics (TCE). In its received form TCE is unconvincing because it neglects the
dynamics of the development of transaction relations, problems of perception and
knowledge, and the influence of the process of interaction between transaction partners
on (perceived) opportunism. A discussion of relevant aspects of the temporal and
cognitive aspects of transactions leads to the proposition that protracted interaction in the
context of transaction relations leads to the production of transaction-specific values in
the form of knowledge etc., n~ to safeguards for these values in the form of
preferences conducive to the preservation of the relation. Interaction between transaction
partners generates information with regard to behavioral characteristics of the parties,
and also influences these characteristics. An analysis of hybrid vertical inter-firm
relations which takes into account the temporal, cogni[ive and behavioral dimensions
yields a set of novel propositions to be compared with and tested against propositions
based on received TCE, in which these dimensions of exchange are omitted.
' Noorderhaven works at Tilburg University, Nooteboom and Berger at the
University of Groningen. Mailing address: Niels G. Noorderhaven, Tilburg University,
P.O.Box 90153, 5000 LE Tilberg, the Netherlands.
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TEMPORAL, COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF
TRANSACTION COSTS; TO AN UNDERSTANDING OF HYBRID
VERTICAL INTER-FIRM RELATIONS'
added theory is necessary if the needs of
empirical studies of transaction cost issues are to
be met ( Williamson 1985, p. 116)
1. INTRODUCTION
Hvbrid Vertical Inter-Firm Relations and Transaction Cost Reasoning
Freyuently, firms enter into protracted relationships with other - formally independent -
firms to which they contract out certain tasks. This kind of protracted relationship (a
'hybrid vertical inter-firm relation') fits into a strategy of balancing flexibility with
predictability. The firm putting out the job can concentrate on its core business and
technology and because of its more limited commitments in terms of for example
specialized assets enjoy an enlarged capability to adapt to changes in market circum-
stances and technological developments. At the same time the firm creates a high level
of predictability in its interaction with part of its environment. Thus protracted hybrid
vertical inter-firm relations can intuitively be understood as a viable answer to the
environmental uncertainty and complexity many firms have to cope with [Borys and
Jemison (1989); Powell (1990)].
At the same time, this kind of relationship between formally independent firms
poses some interesting theoretical problems. The perspective assumed in this article is
that of transaction cost economics (TCE), a theory that has repeatedly been invoked in
the description and explanation of make-or-buy decisions and the resulting economic
structures, of which the hybrid vertical inter-firm relationship is an example [Anderson
and Schmittlein (1984); Heide and John (1990); Joskow (1987); Masten (1984); Masten,
Meehan and Snyder (1989); Monteverde and Teece (1982a), (1982b); Stuckey (1983);
Walker and Poppo (1991); Walker and Weber (1984), (1987)].
From a TCE point of view the hybrid vertical inter-firm relationship is the
outcome of a trade-off between different production technologies with differential
production costs and different governance structures with differential transaction cost
features [Williamson (1975), (1985), (1991)]. In a nutshell, TCE makes us expect hybrid
vertical relations if economies can be realized by applying a special purpose technology
(as opposed to a general purpose technology), but if this special purpose technology is
not fully specific to one individual trading partner. Thus an independent firm,
aggregating demand from various client firms, can presumably achieve economies of
scale or scope inaccessible to an entity integrated into the client firm.
However, to the extent that investments are transaction-specific a pure market
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relationship would pose unacceptable hazards to the trading partners. Consequently a
governance structure somewhere between the extremes of market and hierarchy will be
implemented, leading to a protracted mutual commitment between otherwise independent
parties.
Private Orderin~
In this article we will not take issue with the main contention of TCE, viz. that the
occurrence of hybrid relations has to do with transaction-specific investments, and that
these investments create transaction costs due to opportunism and bounded rationality.
However, we find the way in which the governance structures associated with hybrid
vertical inter-firm reladons are conceptualized in TCE altogether unsatisfactory.
Williamson (1985: Chapters Seven and Eight) assumes that the parties to hybrid
relations make use of the mechanism of 'private ordering' to safeguard
transaction-specific investments. The parties can for instance decide to use a'hostage' to
endorse a commitment.
For instance, a supplier to the automobile industry investing in a press specific to
the needs of a particular client firm, can ask that client to invest in a mould specific to
the supplier's press. This investment functions as a'hostage', and imposes restraints on
the propensity to opportunism [Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978)]. 'Quasi-
integration', investments by a client firm in specific tools to be used by a supplier, is a
frequently used form of private ordering [Masten (1984); Monteverde and Teece
(1982b); Palay (1984)].
By thus carefully crafting the relationship, a balance between mutual dependencies
is created or maintained, and the need for third-party intervention omitted. In essence,
exchange relationships are analyzed as if taking place in a social and legal vacuum.
Williamson's assumption of a'legal vacuum' can be seen as a n;action to the fiction of
legal centralism that is routinely applied in more traditional economic and legal analysis
[Galanter (1981)].
But, as Kronman (1985) points out in his systematic analysis of private ordering,
mechanisms like the exchange of hostages or collaterals can, in the absence of a legal
system and social relations, at best lead to a shaky equilibrium. And although contract
law seems to play a limited role in many business relations [Beale and Dugdale (1975);
Macaulay (1963)], there is also evidence that complex long-term relations primarily
based on the force of contractual arrangements can be viable [see e.g. Goldberg and
Erickson (1987); Joskow (1985), (1987), (1988); and Mulherin (1986)].
We will nevertheless in this article keep focussing on the exchanging dyad typical
of received TCE. The reason for this is not that we think that the wider social and legal
environment is unimportant. In some accounts of hybrid vertical inter-firm relations
social norms are pointed at as an explanatory factor of prime importance. Thus Dore
(1983: 470) places a social norm at the center of his explanation of Japanese
subcontracting: '[the Japanese] most commonly say: benevolence is a duty. Full stop. It
is that sense of duty - a duty over and above the terms of written contract - which gives
assurance of the pay-off which makes relational contracting viable'. In a wider context,
North (1990) effectively explains the emergence and development of institutions,
including social norms, as a necessary measure to reduce transaction costs and thus
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enable the ongoing division of labour on which prosperity is based.
But explicit and systematic attention to social norms falls outside the scope of this
article. By copying the explanatory strategy of received TCE we can more forcefully
bring to the fore what we see as necessary changes in and additions to this theory.
The Temnoral. Cognitive and Behavioral Dimensions
We propose to incorporate into TCE three dimensions abstracted from in the private
ordering view: the temporal, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions.
The temporal dimension is conspicuously absent in received TCE. The 'private
orders' discussed by Williamson (1983, 1985) are a product of rational and conscious ex
ante choices made by the parties; TCE provides no theory of the development of
exchange relations over time.
This situation is unsatisfactory. If the private ordering mechanisms that form the
basis of hybrid vertical relations have to be installed before the actual transactions begin,
this puts a very high strain on the rational faculties of the parties. Not only do they have
to foresee which possible future developments may invoke opportunistic behavior and to
design the requisite safeguards, they also have to take account of and neutralize the
possibility that the very safeguards implemented invoke new forms of opportunism
[Klein (1988); Kronman (1985)]. If we want to avoid a creeping assumption of hyper-
rationality, the temporal dimension of exchange has to be given explicit attention.
A second amendment to received TCE proposed in this article concerns the
cognitive dimension of exchange. In Williamson's view, exchange relations are purely
instrumental [Bowles and Gintis (1990)]. However, if we take seriously the bounds to
the rationality of the parties to a transaction and the uncertainty and complexity of their
environment, this position seems untenable. Trading partners can be an extremely useful
source of information [Hákansson (1989)], and because of this the state of knowledge
and the preferences of a party can be changed in and by the interaction with these firms.
This process may have an effect on both the transaction specificity of investments ~
the safeguards necessary to protect these investments, and thus should be made
endogenous to the analysis.
Thirdly, it seems reasonable to assume that the effects of interaction go beyond the
considerations of given mutual assumptions with regard to opportunism. In the first
place protracted interaction is likely to reveal information regarding the parties' real
inclination towards opportunism. In the second place the very process of interaction may
over time alter this inclination. These two effects, alluded to in this article as the
'behavioral dimension' of exchange, should also be incorporate~l into TCE.
l~rpose and Comnosition of this Article
The purpose of this article is to add a few spoonfuls of complexity to the simplifying
assumptions employed in TCE (Hirschman (1984)]. Parsimony requires that more
complex assumptions should only be introduced if the conditions under which
observations will deviate significantly from the basic model as well as the direction of
these deviations are specified [Kahneman et al. (1986)]. Therefore we will conclude the
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next three Sections of the article with a number of explicit propositions. These
propositions are at variance with those that can be generated by received TCE, and thus
can form the basis of a test of our restated theory against received TCE.
The application of TCE to hybrid vertical inter-firm relations seems to be a useful
strategy for our purpose, because we expect the temporal, cognitive and behavioral
aspects that we want to discuss to play a particularly important role in these relations.
Hybrid relations lack a clearly dominant disciplinary force like competition on the
market or authority within hierarchies. Arguably, cognitive limitations aze most critical
under these circumstances, and an understanding of temporal and behavioral aspects of
exchange relations is most crucial.
A second reason to choose hybrid inter-firm relations as the field of application in
this article is that we hope to construct a mid-range theory (as compared with the more
general TCE) of this class of relations in the future, and test this theory empirically
against received TCE. This goal, however, lies beyond the scope of this article.
Below we will first (Section 2) discuss the temporal dimension, because the
assumption of a more 'dynamic' perspective has important ramifications for the other
two dimensions. Next we will turn to the cognitive dimension of exchange relations, and
challenge the assumptions with regard to knowledge, preferences and opportunism that
aze routinely made in received TCE (Section 3). Building on the ideas pertaining to the
cognitive dimension, we will subsequently (Section 4) discuss the behavioral dimension.
Concluding remarks follow in Section 5.
2. THE TEMPORAL DIMENSION: TRANSACTION AND RELATION
Transactions within Relations
Purportedly, the transaction is the basic unit of analysis in TCE. But in this article we
will focus on the exchange relationship rather than on the transactions taláng place
between the parties.
This shift could be justified by pointing out that Williamson himself, too, tends to
slide towazds a discussion of relations rather than of transactions. A tell-tale formulation
is to be found in Williamson (1985: 17, emphasis added), where '[e]very exchange
r 1 i n' is said to qualify as an issue to be investigated in transaction cost economizing
terms. Indeed, embedding transactions in a time consuming process of exchange, in the
context of a transaction relationship, is required to make TCE coherent. Without that,
one cannot meaningfully employ the customary parlance of setting up an agreement "ex
ante", and coping with problems of control "ex post", with the complications of
monitoring, haggling, renegotiation, handling hostages, arbitration, etc.
The problem of bounded rationality treated in TCE is that one cannot foresee all
the contingencies that may occur during execution of an agreement to transact. In other
words: new facts or conditions may be perceived in time. But if that is allowed, one
must also allow for shifts in the perception and expectation of opportunism, and for
shifts of preference or goals. The claim of TCE is not that all people are opportunistic
all of the time, but that some people are opportunistic some of the time, and since one
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dces not know a priori what will be the case, one should reckon with the possibility of
opportunism. As a transaction relationship develops in time, the (perceived andlor
objective) risk of opportunism is bound to develop as well (note that it dces not
necessarily decrease, but may also increase in a cumulation of suspicion).
Furthermore, the issue of transaction specificity of assets acquires substance only
in the perspective of the possibility of repeated transactions in the future. If such a
perspective is lacking, and it is known that an investment is specific to a single, isolated
transaction, the problem is trivial: the investment will not be made unless it is recouped
in the price to be agreed for that transaction hic et nunc. Non-triviality of the problem of
asset specificity demands the perspective of possible but uncertain ongoing transactions
in the future.
Thus in the remainder of this article we will focus on the hybrid relationship rather
than on the individual transactions taking place in the context of this relationship.
Habitualization and Institutionalization
Business relations are initiated, developed, and possibly (but not necessarily)
strengthened through interaction. Interaction per se refers to the temporal dimension: a
series of successive mutually related individual actions. If the importance of the temporal
dimension is conceded, it means that a given transaction relationship can never be
explained completely on the basis of cross-sectional analysis, transversal in time, alone.
The form of a relationship that can be observed at a given moment has grown through a
process of cumulative causation over the time the parties interact.
In the context of a TCE-like analysis two consequences of a process of interaction
should be emphasized. Firstly, interaction tends to entail the investment of resources in
the relationship, resources that subsequently cannot be put to use elsewhere. If nothing
else, at least attention is 'invested' in a relationship. But frequently also other non-
redeployable resources will be invested [Hákansson (1982)]. Secondly, interaction tends
to generate lock-in effects which may neutralize the risks associated with such
transaction specific (or rather: relation specific) investments'. This lock-in effect may be
the result of habitualization and institutionalization processes, discussed in this Section.
Other lock-in effects that arise in the process of exchange are preferences for
preservation of the relationship (Section 3), and information pertaining to the propensity
to opportunism as well as changes in this propensity itself (Section 4).
If we take into account the complexity and uncertainty of the world, it is self-evident
that parties to a hybrid vertical relationship will look for strategies for economizing on
their limited rational faculties. One such strategy is habitualization. According to Berger
and Luckmann (1966) any human activity that is nypeated frequently is subject to
habitualization. Habitualization frees the individual from a plethora of decisions, and
thus provides 'a psychological relief. In a process of interaction habitualized actions
may be reciprocally typified by interacting parties:
A watches B perform. He attributes morives to B's actions and, seeing the actions
recur, typifies the motives as recurrent. As B goes on performing, A is soon able to
say to himself, "Aha, there he goes again ". At the same time, A may assume that B
is doing the same thing with regard to him. From the beginning, both A and B
assume this reciprocity of typ~cation. [....J The most important gain is that each
will be able to predict the other's actions. Concomitantly, the interaction of both
becomes predictable [Berger and Luckmann (1966, pp. 53-54)]
Habitualization is a process on the level of the individual, and can in the contezt of
hybrid vertical inter-firm relations be expected between, say, a sales manager of the
supplier firm and a purchaser of the buyer finm. If the process were to stop here, the
influence of protracted interaction between firms would arguably be very limited.
Functionaries hold a certain office only for a limited time, and are restricted in their
freedom to perform their task according to their own preferences.
But Berger and Luckmann (1966) continue their analysis by assuming that other
parties join A and B's social universe:
The institutional world, which existed in statu nascendi in the original situation of
A and B, is now passed on to others. [...J This means that the institutions that
have now been crystallized [...J are experienced as existing over and beyond the
individuals who "happen to" embody them at the moment. In other words, the
institutions are now experienced as possessing a reality of their own, a realiry that
confronts the individuals as an external atut coercive fact [Berger and Luckmann
(1966, p. 55)]
If patterns of interaction between two firms are institutionaliied, the predictability of
behavior is no longer dependent on the identity of the incumbents. The reciprocal
typification of actions and the concomitant predictability becomes a general characteristic
of the relationship between the firms, regardless of variance at the individual level.
t~pportunistic behavior will be much less attractive in an institutionalized context,
as it threatens to disrupt the relationship, and leads to higher future transaction costs.
Implications for TCE
As we have seen, specificity of investments tends to increase with the age of the
exchange relationship. At the same time habitualization of actions and institutionalization
of the relationship raise the costs associated with opportunism, and thus make explicit
safeguards redundant. These two observations give rise to the following general
propositions, which cannot be logically deduced from received TCE ("explicit
safeguards" refer to written contracts and private oi-dering arrangements):
Proposition I: At a given level of transaction-specific investments, explicit
safeguards are expected to be lower if the relationship is older.
Proposition II: At a given level of explicit safeguards, higher transaction-specific
investments are to be expected if the relationship is older.
If habitualization and institutionalization were all there is to exchange relations, the risk
of opportunism would still loom large, and abstinence from explicit safeguards would
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still under many circumstances be a foolish strategy. But there are additional factors
rendering stability to hybrid vertical inter-firm relations. In the next two sections we will
turn to these additional factors.
3. THE COGNITIVE DIMENSION: INNOVATION AND LEAItNING
Transactions and Innovation
Williamson (1985, pp. 143-144) grants that 'the study of economic organization in a
regime of rapid innovation poses much more difficult issues than those addressed here'
and that '[n]ew hybrid forms of organization may appear in response to such a condition
[...]. Much more study of the relations between organization and innovation is needed'.
Since at present business operates under such a'regime of rapid innovation', further
insight is of some importance.
Innovation entails changes in knowledge and competence, and the new perspectives
that these changes yield entail change of preference. Thus, in a context of innovation,
we can no longer take knowledge and preferences as given; they must be made
endogenous. That is what a truly dynamic theory requires. In our study of transactions
we further need to include the role of exchange relations in the formation of knowledge
and preferences, and to deal with the implications for uncertainty and opportunism, the
resulting effects on transaction costs, and the choice of governance structures.
In TCE, bounded rationality is taken to arise from the scarcity or cost of informa-
tion and limited capacity for information processing. lf rationality were unbounded, all
possible contingencies could be foreseen, even those arising from opportunism, and
could be incorporated in a contract prior to commitment. But there is more to the
boundedness of rationality that is relevant to TCE.
Since transactions aze embedded in ongoing relations of exchange, there is time for
knowledge and preferences to develop and affect the governance of transactions. In time,
the bounds of knowledge, preferences and perceived risk of opportunism may shift. In
decision making, economics focuses on the choice between given alternatives, but the
prior issue concerns the identification of alternatives and the objective of choice2. In a
dynamic context, new outcomes of known options for action, new options and new goals
may be perceived as time proceeds.
The point now is that the value of transaction relations lies not only, and perhaps
not primarily, in satisfying wants according to present preferences and knowledge, but
also, and perhaps primarily, in developing new perceptions, understanding and
preferences. This may be called the 'transcendental' role of transactions or transaction
relations (in a Kantian sense). In the present section we concentrate on the formation of




We now need a theory of knowledge (epistemology), and in particular a theory of
acquisition and change of knowledge (genetic epistemology; for a more detailed
discussion see Nooteboom (1991a), which draws on work by Michael Polanyi and Jean
Piaget). Implicitly, neoclassical theory and TCE assume that while information may be
costly to obtain, and capacity to process it may be costly or limited, all information is in
principle available to all 'from the shelfin a given form, containing or generating
objective truth. The underlying empiricist epistemology, however, is defunct and has
been since the philosopher Kant. In terms of Kantian 'critical' philosophy: mainstream
economics is uncritical of perception and knowledge [similar criticism of the
epistemological foundations of neoclassical economics and TCE was given earlier by
Etzioni (1988) and Hodgson (1988) among others]. Perception and thought are conditio-
ned by categories of understanding, in the double sense of being made possible n~
being limited by them. Apart from giving form or coherence to otherwise
incomprehensible sense impressions, categories perform the heuristic function of shutting
out impressions that do not fit the present purpose. To be receptive to and explicitly
awaze of all available bits of information all the time, regardless of context or purpose,
would eliminate all purpose. The problem increasingly is not how we can obtain all
available information, but how we can ignore irrelevant information. We set agendas for
rational evaluation according to the context, and do not consider what is not on them.
To be effective, organizations also have to define what is relevant in order to shut
out noise, and this requires some coordination of the perceptions and perspectives of
individuals within the firm. This function is performed by administrative and social
routines, supported by the use of symbols and rituals. As a result, different organizations
not only have different preferences, but entertain different perceptions, and interpret the
same phenomenon differently. What is perceived, known and communicated in a firm
depends on its past, embodied in its culture and routines, and on its context. As
suggested by Pfeffer and Salancik (198~), there will be some variance of perception and
preference within a firm, according to the function, i.e. the resource that is represented.
Different functions will interpret the interest of the firm from different perspectives, but
on the basis of a common experience, position and orientation of the firm. To be
effective one needs a focus, but having a focus means not seeing everything.
Categories of knowledge are often acquired and developed in practice (in learning
by doing), whereby they are context-dependent and cumulative, and may be 'tacit' (cf.
Michael Polanyi)3. It is difficult to be critical of one's own knowledge or skills if they
aze tacit.
As taught by Rogers (1983), the first stage in the adoption of something new is
awareness of a need and the availability of the novelty to satisfy it. With tacit knowledge
this may be problematic, and one may need a transaction partner who takes a different
perspective and has different but complementazy experience, to achieve awareness.
Next, when awareness has been created and one wants to adopt a novel way of doing
things, tacit knowledge is hazd to adopt from someone else, particularly by explanation
and specification of rules. If at all, tacit knowledge can be transferred only by ostension
(showing how one dces it), or after it has been made more explicit. When knowledge is
cumulative it is difficult to transfer because it requires underlying capabilities to be
effective. When knowledge is tacit or cumulative or both (the two tend to go together),
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transfer is more easily performed by the transfer of the person (or the firm) in which the
knowledge is embodied, or by working togethet`.
Implications for TCE
The complications that arise in the acquisition of knowledge, due to categories of
perception and understanding and their variance between firms, and the tacit, contextual
and cumulative nature of a good deal of knowledge, have several implications for TCE.
Hybrid vertical inter-firm relations carry more value, and a greater preference for
continuity of the relationship, than meets the eye from the perspective of comparative
statics of standard TCE.
Firstly, there is what we called a transcendental value of tr~ansaction partners: they
are a source of perceptions and perspectives that are complementary to one's own, based
on a different context and experience. In other words: partners enhance one's potential.
A partner may be chosen for his expected capacity for such enhancement, rather than
only for his capacity to satisfy demands presently perceived [Nooteboom (1991b)]. lfiis
may contribute to a symmetry of dependence, by which safeguards against opportunism
may be less needed than without this added value of a transaction relationship. It may
contribute to an explanation of an observed lack of more visible safeguards.
Secondly, to benefit from this a relationship must be lasting to some extent, since
the enhancement of potential takes time, and investments must be made to establish and
improve effective links for the exchange of knowledge. This also may reduce (perceived)
risk of opportunism, and may serve to explain otherwise inexplicable continuities of
transaction relations in spite of apparent opportunities elsewhere.
Thirdly, there are obstacles to the make-or-buy decision: due to problems of
technology transfer, as a result of tacitness, contextuality and cumulativeness of
knowledge, one may not be able to produce an input, no matter how specific it is to
one's own needs. On the other hand, one may not be able to contract production out to
an independent producer, no matter how few transaction specific investments are
required. Thus we may well observe transaction relations in spite of highly transaction-
specific investments, either because the relation is chosen for its (unique or
indispensable) potential for learning, or because the user would simply not be able to
produce the item himself. Conversely, one may see several firms in an industry
producing an input that dces not require investments specific to the input for any one
firm, because there simply is no independent supplier capable of producing and
delivering it.
All these considerations, while complicating the analysis, lead to several
propositions pertaining to the relationship between the characteristics of the (process of)
knowledge and information production and diffusion within a certain industry and the
characteristics of hybrid vertical inter-firm relations. For the sake of simplicity, the
characteristics of the industry will be treated as a dichotomous variable: an industry
either operates under a regime of rapid innovation, or dces not.
Proposition lll: In innovative industries vertical relations will tend to be more
durable than in industries with a slower pace of innovation.
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Proposition IV: In innovative industries the level of asset specificity within vertical
relationships will be higher than in industries with a slower pace of
innovation.
A third proposition pertains to the relationship between inter-firm relations and the
process of innovation, regardless of the characteristics of the industry:
Proposition V: Within a given industry, firms maintaining hybrid vertical
relationships will be more innovative than firms lacking this kind of
relationship.
4. THE BEHAVIORAL DIMENSION: TRUST AND BONDING
The Concept of 'Trust'
In this section we propose that 'opportunism', one of the main behavioral assumptions of
TCE, should be treated as a variable rather than a constants.
The reason for this proposition is that intuition and casual empiricism point out
that in real-worid business relations opportunism is not always present to the same
degree. Firms spend resources to select 'trustworthy' partners in the first place
[Dasgupta (1988)], and subsequently engage in policies aimed at increasing the mutual
trust in the relationship [Lorenz (1988)]. If economic agents were invariably
opportunistic, this kind of behavior would not make sense. But if we assume a
continuum of motivational structures, with pure opportunism at one extreme and pure
trustworthiness at the other, a discriminating strategy of trust may under the right
circumstances be the rational choice.
To 'trust' another party means to engage voluntarily in a course of action the
outcome of which is contingent on choices made by that other party, and the possible
damage caused may be greater than the benefits soughtb. Such a course of action can
only be confiden[ly chosen if the truster believes that the other party will give due
weight to his interests, or, in other words, is of a'trustworthy' character.
A purely opportunistic party maximízes its own payoff without allowing for
considerations of fairness or hesitation to breach agreements. A purely trustworthy party
would ex post, after a commitment has been made, disregazd its own payoff and pay
attention only to the moral dimension of exchange. That is, it will stick to the substance
of the agreement even if it incurs considerable cost in doing so.
All real-world economic agents would be expected to be located somewhere in
between these two extremes. This means that their individual payoff carries weight in
their decision-making, but that they are sometimes prepared to incur a cost in order to
punish or reward other parties. Experimental evidence indicates that people in fact act in
this way, and that opportunism is not a characteristic of all individuals to the same
degree [Antonides (1991); Deutsch (1973); Frank (1988); Kahneman et al. (1986)].
In the above we have mostly referred to 'parties', leaving the question of the level
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of aggregation unresolved for the time being. However, the experiments with regard to
non-opportunistic behavior have all been conducted with individual respondents, while
we are primarily interested in inter-firm relations. The individual and the organizational
levels interact through 'mechanisms [thatJ are easy to intuit, if ponderous to spell out'
[Dore (1983, p. 466)]. Can we also assume a continuum of motivational structures of
firms?
In our opinion, there are good n~asons for this assumption. The goals of a firm,
particularly a small firm, are in part a reflection of the personal and role-defined goals
of its most influential manager(s) [Simon (1964)]. [f many individuals have preference
schemes incorporating considerations of fairness, the firms they manage may very well
display parallel constraints on the more 'egoistic' goal of profit maximization.
In larger firms decision-making is to a high degree governed by organizational
rules, procedures, and routines. These rules, etc. are forms of institutionalizeà behavior;
they reflect past experience and learning, and are not routinely questioned by the
organization members whose behavior is programmed by them [Cyert and March
(1963); Nelson and Winter (1982)]. It is very well conceivable that some rules, etc. lead
to more harshness vis-à-vis suppliers and clients than others.
In the case of individuals, trustworthiness and the ability to engage in trusting
behavior are relatively stable character traits. The basis for these traits is laid in early
childhood [Eisenstadt and Roniger (1984, pp. 31-32); Petermann (1985)]. But recurrent
and salient experiences (e.g., recurrent 'betrayal') may presumably change these traits
even in adults. Thus, trustworthiness should be considered to vary not only between
individuals, but also within individuals over time. This kind of change, however, will
normally be only incremental, and should be if the concept of 'trustworthiness' is to
have meaning.
Organizational rules and procedures change over time as a result of, for example,
changes in the external environment of the firm, or personnel changes, particularly in
top-management. Therefore just like in the case of individuals, trustworthiness of firms
should be treated as a variable longitudinally, within a given firm, as well as cross-
sectionally, between firms.
Assuming this perspective on opportunism and trustworthiness we will in the
subsections below consider the effects of differences in trustworthiness of the exogenous
kind (i.e. independent on the interaction in a specific relationship) and changes in
trustworthiness of an endogenous nature (i.e. resulting from the process of interaction ín
a specific relationship).
Exogenous Trustworthiness and Reputation
Consider a world with two kinds of economic agents: trustworthy agents and
opportunistic agents. The first kind of agent would in a Prisoner's Dilemma always play
the cooperative move, the other would always play the defective move'. Clearly, both
kinds of agents would prefer to interact with trustworthy parties only. But if it is
impossible to distinguish between the two ex ante, exchange dyads will be formed by
chance, the opportunists will on the average do better than the trustworthy, and
assuming some kind of natural selection mechanism the latter will gradually disappear,
at least, if interactions between pairs of individuals are not repeated (Axelrod (1984)].
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If on the other hand parties recognize previous interactants, they will choose to
continue interaction if the other has in the past proved to be trustworthy. This means
that stable relations will be formed only between trustworthy agents, and that these pairs
will do better than the unstable relationships involving at least one opportunist.
The relevance of this line of reasoning to the analysis of hybrid vertical inter-firm
relations is clear. Although a number of clues may be available, at the individual level
[Frank (1988)] as well as that of the firm, it will most of the time be difficult to judge
the trustworthiness of a prospective exchange partner. However, the experience gained
in protracted interaction gives first-hand information on the other's inclination to
opportunisme. Thus exchange relationships between trustworthy parties will tend to be
more durable than pure market relations; high levels of asset specificity are possible
without expensive safeguazds; and transaction costs can be low.
There is a difference between the argument expounded here and that which rests
on reputation effects. Rowe (1989) employs the assumption that parties are invariably
opportunistic, but that they may choose to follow rules of action which make them
behave as if they were not. This course of action enables them to reap the same benefits
as those that would accrue to the truly trustworthy. The argument hinges on reputation
effects berause 'the only reason an agent can have for maintaining his rule of action is
that his failing to do so might adversely affect the beliefs of others that he will maintain
that rule in the future' [Rowe (1989, p. 24); see also Klein (1985)].
While not denying the relevance of reputation effects, we feel the concept is
somewhat overstretched in Rowe's analysis. T'he effectiveness of reputation effects
depends among other things on the efficiency of information diffusion; on the number of
players; and on characteristics of the exchange (frequency, homogeneity of the good or
service, ambiguity of performance measures). Cleazly reputation effects aze no panacea
for all transaction problems caused by opportunism [Williamson (1985, p. 396)].
The reputation argument complicates the analysis, because reputation and
experience based trust can lead to the same effect, i.e. relatively low safeguards at a
given level of asset specificity. If reputation effects were perfect, the process of
interaction would yield no new information about the other party's trustworthiness, and
parties would feel safe to invest in specific assets even in young relationships. If we can
measure the importance of reputation effects in different industries, the reputation and
the trust effect can be partly disentangled: we would expect relatively high levels of
asset specificity without proportional safeguards in young relationships to occur in
industries with efficient reputation effects, but not in those industries where serious
impediments to reputation effects exist.
If trustworthiness is a chazacter trait influenced by education and social and
cultural factors in general, the average level and variance of trustworthiness of
individuals is likely to be different in different countries or regions. In the case of firms,
differences between industries may also occur. Consequently, we can on the basis of the
above generate two propositions with regard to hybrid vertical inter-firm relations:
Proposition VI: In industries in which reputation effects play an important role
relatively low safeguards at a given level of asset specificity in .
young relationships will occur more frequently than in industries in
which reputation effects are less important.
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Proposition VII: The incidence of hybrid vertical inter-firm relations in a particular
industry will differ between countries or regions.
In the formulation of these propositions, reference to specific measures of
trustworthiness has deliberately been omitted. Although a number of instruments have
been developed, the direct measurement of trust and trustworthiness at the level of
individuals is not without problems [Petermann (1985)]. The same problems are to be
expected with regard to the measurement of trust and trustworthiness at the level of
firms (or organizations and institutions in general). In empirical research on inter-
organizational relations, direct measures of trust have been used by some [Noorderhaven
(1992)], while indirect measurement was preferred by others (Zucker (1986)].
In the context of hybrid vertical inter-firm relations, the possibility of obtaining
direct measures of trustworthiness leads to an additional proposition:
Proposition VIII: Firms engaged in hybrid vertical relations will, on average, be more
trustworthy than comparable firms in their country, region, or
industry.
Endogenous Trustworthiness and BondinE
In section III we allowed for learning in the sense of a shift of knowledge. But then we
should also allow for shifts of preferences, which constitute a change of objectives or
values. This brings us to the effect that a transaction relationship may have on the
commitment to that relation. Commitments may grow stronger, which we call 'bonding',
or they may grow weaker. As the commitment to the relationship in the process of
bonding increases, the exercise of opportunism is reduced. This relieves the problem of
bounded rationality: with less threat of opportunism, there is less one needs to foresee
and take into account. One feels confident to look less at safeguards against opportunism
and more at opportunities for further learning or improvement of quality.
There is bonding in a weak and in a strong sense. In 'weak bonding'9 potential
opportunism (its scope, or the inclination towards it) is unmodified, and in that sense
preferences or values have not shifted, but out of self-interest opportunism is not
exercised. The reason may be that one has already invested so much in the relationship
that the switching cost or loss of reputation involved in its breaking up due to the
exercise of opportunism is too great. Weak bonding corresponds to the 'lock-in' of
standard TCE.
In 'strong bonding' preferences have shifted to narrow the boundaries or scope of
opportunism: one wants to be less opportunistic, apart from direct self-interest. Strong
bonding may be individualized, relating only to a specific partner in a specific
transaction relation. Or it may be generaliied, relating to similar relations in general,
because experience has led to the adoption of a new behavioral norm or a new
organizational procedure. Of course, experience may also work the other way round: the
generation of antipathy or hatred, or the bn~akdown of some previously held norm.
The possibility of a shift from opportunism to trustworthiness or vice versa has
empirical implications for TCE, but it is difficult to generalize these implications. If
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relations 'go well', attention to safeguards against opportunism may rapidly subside.
Firms which have experienced no failed relations may become naive: few safeguards
may be installed ín spite of highly transaction specific investments. While this may be
warranted within a given market and region where the experience was obtained, a step
outside may be punishing. Conversely, one may observe sudden breakdowns of inter-
firm relations owing to inducements that seem only slight: betrayal of trust on some
minor point may cause a shift in perception, preference or behavioral norm.
On the whole, it seems reasonable to assume that natural selection weeds out
unfounded preference shifts, and that in most cases increases in trustworthiness and
reliance on trust are mutual and sound.
If no direct measures of trustworthiness are available, the assumption of decreasing
opportunism in durable ezchange reladons does not lead to new propositions with regard
to hybrid vertical inter-firm relations. However, propositions I and II formulated in
section [I are endorsed. Relatively low safeguards are possible in 'old' relationships not
only because of habitualization and institutionalization, but also because of preference
shifts.
On the other hand, if direct measurement of trust and trustworthiness ~ possible,
the proposition on the basis of the above discussion is obvious:
Proposition IX: The level of trustworthiness of the parties to hybrid vertical inter-
firm relations will tend to increase over time, as dces the level of
(mutual) trust.
5. CONCLUSION
The conceptualization in received TCE of hybrid vertical inter-firm relations as 'private
orders' is unconvincing because it neglects relevant temporal, cognitive, and behavioral
aspects of transactions. A discussion of these three dimensions of exchange relations
leads to a number of propositions with regazd to the kind of relationships investigated.
These propositions can form the basis of more specific hypotheses to be tested in the
context of an empirical investigation into a particular category of relations in a particular
geographical region and within a particulaz time-frame.
Thus, the observations and arguments propounded above can be seen as a
translation of 'pure TCE' into a much less general mid-range theory, pertaining to a
limited class of phenomena. This has indeed been our primary goal in writing this paper,
and we intend to put our ideas to the test of empirical research in the near future.
At the same time, we think that some of our criticism of received TCE transcends
the realm of hybrid vertical inter-firm relations. The conceptualization of market
relations as well as hierarchical relations in TCE is overly simplifying and schematic.
Some criticism to that effect can be found in Bradach and Eccles (1989); Granovetter
(1985); Hodgson (1988); Macneil ( 1981); and Schreuder (1991). Perhaps explicit
attention to temporal, cognitive and behavioral aspects will also be advisable in fleshing
out the relatively 'pure' forms of market relations and hierarchical relations.
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NOTES
This article is a product of a research project carried out by the authors in
cooperation with Bartjan Pennink (University of Groningen). The project is sponsored
by the Economics Research Foundation, which is part of the Netherlands'
Organization for Scientific Research (NWO).
1. Williamson (1979: 240) with 'lock-in' refers to the (mutual) dependency caused by
transaction-specific investments. We use the term also to refer to other mechanisms
forging a bond between the parties.
2. The difference between choice and the prior identification of alternatives is related to
the well-known difference between risk and more radical uncertainty (as discussed by
Frank Knight and Keynes). Under risk the class of alternatives and their outcomes is
known, and uncertainty is limited to the question which outcome will be realised with
what probability. Under uncertainty one does not know all alternatives or outcomes.
3. Williamson is one of the rare economists to have recognised the relevance of Michael
Polanyi's work for economics, but has not fully carried through the implications of
tacit knowledge for TCE.
4. This has important implications for the diffusion of new technology and for related
business services, particularly with respect to small business. Cf. Nooteboom, Zwart
and Bijmolt (1992); Nooteboom, Ccehoorn and Van der Zwaan (1991).
5. Williamson (1985: 47-49) in fact dces not assume that opportunism is a constant.
However, the variability of opportunism is neutralized in TCE by assuming that it is
impossible to distinguish ex ante opportunistic parties from trustworthy parties.
Therefore, safeguards should be installed in every case.
6. This definition of 'trust' is consistent with those used in most of the literature. For a
discussion of the concept, its applications, and empirical evidence see e.g. Barber
(1983); Deutsch (1973); Gambetta (1988); and Petermann (1985).
7. For an extensive discussion of the Prisoner's Dilemma see Axelrod (1984).
8. Williamson (1985) also makes this observation, in a footnote to page 59. But his only
conclusion is that the organization of economic activity is more complicated as a
result.
9. By 'weak bonding' we mean bonding in the weak sense, based on self-interest, but
the bond thus created may be quite strong. Conversely, by 'strong bonding' we mean
bonding in the strong sense, based on a lesser desire or taste for opportunism, but the
bond thus created may be quite weak.
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